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Digital Music Sarr pli.1.ng ad
Copyright Law:
Can The Interests of Copyright Owners and Sampling
Artists Be Reconciled?
[ By Carlos Ruiz de la Torre*]
Copyright law governing digitalmusic sampling is faced with twocompeting interests: first, theowners of recording and compo-sition copyrights need to be rea-
sonably compensated when their
creative works are re-used by sam-
pling artists, but secondly, sam-
pling artists should have a reasonable degree
of freedom to rework fragments of existing
ous proposals, evaluating each their strengths
and weaknesses with respect to the five goals.
Ultimately, it will conclude that compulsory
license schemes are best suited to solving, or
at least minimizing, the problem.
I. Description of Sampling
and Current State of the Law
Sampling has become very common
"Current copyright infringement
tests relevant to sampling are
vague, making it difficult for
sampling artists to know the
boundaries,"
recordings at a reasonable cost. A system
needs to balance these interests and reduce
the degree of uncertainty that arises when the
use of a sample infringes a copyright. This
Article will discuss the current state of the law
as it relates to digital sampling and will then
articulate five goals that should be taken into
account by any proposed solution to the sam-
pling problem. It will also discuss the vari-
in modern popular music, particularly in the
genres of rap, hip-hop, electronic dance mu-
sic, and rock. The technique extracts frag-
ments from existing recordings and incorpo-
rates them into new musical works, manipu-
lating their melodic, harmonic, rhythmic, or
vocal characteristics in various ways. The
process offers infinite possibilities for refash-
ioning the raw material and "looping," a tech-
SEVENTH ANNUAL ENTERTAINMENT LAW INITIATIVE ESSAY COMPETITION
nique whereby a single sample is repeated con-
tinually for an extended period.
Current copyright infringement tests
relevant to sampling are vague, making it diffi-
cult for sampling artists to know the bound-
aries. Additionally, purchasing the appropriate
licenses can be overly expensive, depending on
the extent of the re-use and the cooperative-
ness of the copyright owners. This situation
can result in diminished musical creativity due
to prohibitive costs, or worse, copyright own-
ers who just don't get paid.'
The current procedure for obtaining li-
censes involves considerable administrative
(time) and financial costs.' In general, licenses
must be acquired for use of both the sound re-
cording (typically owned by the record com-
pany) and the notated form of the musical com-
position (typically owned by a publishing house
doctrine, which argues that the re-use is ulti-
mately trivial use that does not amount to in-
fringement.' However, the test for determin-
ing "trivial use" is exceedingly vague. Courts
attempt to determine whether an "ordinary lay
listener" would find a "substantial similarity"
between the pre-existing recording and the new
work,9 or whether the "quantitative or qualita-
tive" appropriation of elements of the original
recording is significant.10 Fair use, on the other
hand, is a defense based on the idea that some
unlicensed uses of copyrighted works are justi-
fied because they serve a desired social purpose
(e.g., criticism or commentary)." As a defense
in sampling cases, fair use has generally only
been successful for new musical works that
parody pre-existing recorded works.
12
These defenses, however, have been
threatened by a recent Sixth Circuit ruling. In
"... copyright law should encourage
creativity. However... the current
state of the law tends to discourage
the creativity of sampling artists"
or the composer).3 Recording licenses are most
often purchased via a flat fee or royalty arrange-
ment.4 Flat fees range from $100 to over
$10,000, while royalties to recording owners
range between half a cent and three cents for
every copy of the track sold.5 Musical compo-
sition licenses typically give "the copyright
holder a percentage ownership in the new
work's musical composition copyright," as well
as an advance of a few thousand dollars on the
expected publishing income.6 Often, 15% of
the new work's musical composition copyright
might be assigned to the original work's author,
and if the sample is looped and used repeat-
edly, the percentage could increase to 66%.
7
For sampling artists who decline to pay
for these licenses, there are currently two de-
fenses: de minimis and fair use. The strongest
defense for sampling artists is the de minimis
Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, the
court articulated a new, bright-line test whereby
any unlicensed copying of a sound recording,
no matter how minor, constitutes infringe-
ment. 3 The court reasoned that, because 17
U.S.C. § 114(b) gives a sound recording copy-
right holder the exclusive right "to duplicate
the sound recording," any duplication whatso-
ever amounts to infringement. 4 If this deci-
sion were applied nationwide, both the de mini-
mis and fair use defenses would no longer ap-
ply in the context of sound recordings. As such,
this decision is unworkable and fails to balance
the competing interests of copyright owners and
sampling artists.
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1I. Goals for Any Proposed So-
lution
The Constitution is clear that the pur-
pose of copyright law is to "promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts."15 In
other words, copyright law should encourage
creativity.16 However, as discussed above, the
current state of the law tends to discourage the
creativity of sampling artists. The problem re-
mains: how can we balance fair compensation
for copyright owners without inhibiting the
development of sampled music genres?
Any potential solution to the sampling
copyright problem should aim to achieve five
goals. The solution should: (1) set clear, pre-
dictable boundaries for sampling artists, (2)
keep costs reasonable for sampling artists, (3)
minimize the use of litigation to settle infringe-
ment questions, (4) minimize the difficulties
involved in negotiating licenses, and (5) pro-
vide adequate economic benefits for copyright
owners (so they will have an incentive to pro-
duce new works). The first four goals tend to
encourage the creativity of sampling artists,
while the fifth goal encourages creativity among
composers of new music that does not incor-
porate samples. Additionally, the third and
fourth goals would reduce administrative and
enforcement costs for copyright owners.
1 7
T1L Alternatives to Current Tests
The following alternatives have been
proposed by various commentators as possible
solutions to the sampling problem: compulsory
licensing, voluntary structured negotiation, the
economic approach, the pattern-oriented ap-
proach, and educational use.
A. Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory license schemes for
samples would be based on the current com-
pulsory mechanical license for the recording of
"cover" songs, which are new versions of exist-
ing songs. When an artist covers a song, they
must purchase a compulsory mechanical li-
cense from the copyright holder pursuant to
Section 115 of the Copyright Act. 8 The cur-
rent rate is 8.5 cents (or 1.65 cents per minute)
paid to the original work's publisher for every
copy of the track sold.19
A fair licensing scheme for samples must
take into account the length and substantiality
of the fragment sampled in determining the
appropriate rate.20 At least two different means
have been proposed to vary the compulsory li-
cense fees according to the substantiality of the
re-use: Charles E. Maier's approach and Josh
Norek's approach.
21
Maier divides the spectrum of re-uses
into three categories. 22 The first category, "sub-
stantial violations" (in which the new work is
more "imitative" than "transformative"), would
require payment of the same rate that applies
for cover songs. The second category, de mini-
mis and transformative uses, would require no
fee payment. The majority of cases fall in be-
tween the above two categories; thus, payment
of only a portion of the current compulsory li-
cense fee would be required (e.g., 50%).
Norek also proposes three basic subdi-
visions for varying compulsory license fees ac-
cording to the substantiality of the re-use.
23
First, there are "qualitatively insignificant
samples" where someone familiar with the
original work would not easily identify or rec-
ognize the source of the sample without hav-
ing been told of its source and "qualitatively
significant samples of three seconds or less used
only once" would require no payment. Sec-
ond, a "qualitatively significant sample of three
seconds or less that is looped and occurs re-
peatedly" would require payment of only a
portion of the current compulsory license fee;
Norek suggests two cents for every copy sold.
Finally, "qualitatively significant samples greater
than three seconds" would continue to require
"negotiation and clearance of both the sound
recording and the musical composition, as per
current music industry practice."
24
These compulsory licensing schemes
would, for the most part, achieve the five goals
set forth in Section II above. Copyright own-
ers would be adequately compensated, sam-
pling artists would pay reasonable licensing fees
tailored to the substantiality of their re-uses, and
negotiation time would generally be mini-
mized. Norek's proposal would eliminate a
considerable portion of the work of negotiat-
ing licenses, at least for the majority of samples
that are three seconds or less in length. Maier's
approach would largely eliminate the need for
negotiation, provided that sampling artists and
copyright owners could agree on which of the
3 Vanderbilt journal of Entertainment Law & Pra
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three categories applied in any given case.
To some extent, however, these propos-
als fail to entirely eliminate the need for litiga-
tion and do not achieve complete clarity in de-
fining the boundaries to sampling artists. For
instance, in Norek's proposal, "qualitatively sig-
nificant samples greater than three seconds"
would still be negotiated as per current music
industry practice. There is also the potentially
tricky matter of determining when a sample is
"qualitatively insignificant." Under Maier's
proposal, substantial re-uses would be charged
at the cover song rate, de minimis uses would
be free, and most cases in between would re-
quire payment of half the cover song rate. Maier
assumes that the extent of sampling in the ma-
jority of new works would fall somewhere be-
tween de minimis and substantial re-use. How-
ever, many of the same problems might inevi-
tably arise since the boundaries between cat-
egories remain unclear and litigation may be
necessary to resolve infringement questions.
B. Voluntary Structured Nego-
tiation
Jason H. Marcus argues that the institu-
tion of a compulsory licensing system for
samples would be impractical and premature
because it "would require absolute cooperation
of all in the music industry, and may need to
be statutory in order to be implemented."25
Instead, he supports a "voluntary scheme,
which, if effective over an extended period of
time, could then be reported to Congress and
the Copyright Office with the goal of possibly
amending the Copyright Act to apply to digital
sampling."
26
The voluntary negotiation approach pro-
posed by Marcus involves a licensing system
based on good faith and fair dealing whereby
artists negotiate with copyright owners in a pre-
dictable, established manner.27 Record com-
panies and sampling artists would have gen-
eral guidelines to follow during negotiations
relating to reasonable pricing expectations and
the negotiation process itself. Apparently, the
record industry and musicians unions could
work together to establish the guidelines. They
would strive to avoid litigation and to balance
fair financial rewards for sampled artists and
artistic freedom for sampling artists.
28
Sampling artists or their representatives
would first attempt to obtain clearances with-
out making payment for all samples used. The
parties would then negotiate payment sched-
ules for the remaining samples at fair and rea-
sonable rates, taking into consideration various
factors specific to each situation, including the
substantiality of the re-use and "whether the
use is offensive to the holder of the copyright."
29
Some obvious problems with the vol-
untary structured negotiation approach are that
there include the lack of guarantee of fair deal-
ing and the fact that some players in the indus-
try may not be willing to go along with the
guidelines. If copyright owners choose not to
follow the guidelines, then a chain reaction of
negative consequences could follow. Sampling
artists might face unreasonably high costs, ex-
tensive negotiations and litigation could ensue,
and the ideal of clear boundaries for sampling
artists by way of the guidelines would become
meaningless.
In theory, this approach minimizes the
difficulty of negotiating licenses because the
parties can follow general negotiation guide-
lines. However, unless definitive guidelines
become established and widely practiced
throughout the industry, this approach may not
drastically reduce the significant administrative
(time) and financial costs associated with the
current system.
C. Economic Approach
David S. Blessing has formulated an
approach that weighs the various costs to copy-
right owners and sampling artists. The social
costs of copyright protection involve two ma-
jor categories: (1) access costs and (2) adminis-
trative and enforcement costs.3" Access costs
fall on both consumers and sampling artists.
Consumers who value the work at less than its
price won't pay for it and are denied access.
Likewise, access costs fall on sampling artists
"who are deterred from building upon prior
works because they are unwilling to pay the
price the copyright holder demands."31 Thus,
access costs generally discourage the creation
of new works that incorporate samples.
Administrative and enforcement costs
include the "costs of excluding trespassers, and
apprehending and sanctioning violators," as
well as the costs of setting up the boundaries of
what constitutes permissible re-use of a work.32
Surnmer 2005 404
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From an artist's perspective, enforcement costs
are a necessary evil because some degree of copy-
right protection is needed to create economic
incentives for the creation of original works.
However, an artist's incentive to protect works
via copyright only goes so far: if enforcement
costs are too high, then it may not be practical
to protect de minimis elements of the artist's
work.
A proper infringement test would keep
both access costs and enforcement costs low.
Thus, this kind of economic approach "allows
unauthorized borrowing in numerous circum-
stances that in turn promote artistic innova-
tion."3 3 Blessing suggests the following as guid-
ing questions: Did the original artist contem-
plate that portions of his work would be ex-
tracted, and did this discourage his creative ef-
fort? Does the sampling artist's reuse of the
extraction tend to discourage other artists from
composing original works?3 4 If the answer to
both is no, then the re-use is de minimis.
The economic approach attempts to
objectively take into account all of the subtle
economic factors affecting copyright owners
and sampling artists. However, the approach
is flawed because, as Blessing himself notes, it
"is too ambiguous and requires an ad hoc analy-
sis. " B5 Thus, the proposal does not aid in set-
ting clear, predictable boundaries for sampling
artists. It is not likely that negotiation time or
the need for litigation would be reduced by this
approach. Moreover, it seems unlikely to this
Author that the practices of sampling artists
would ever deter other artists from composing
original works. Hence, Blessing's plan may dis-
proportionately benefit sampling artists while
leaving copyright owners under-compensated.
D. Pattern-Oriented Approach
Professor Michael J. Madison argues
that courts should consider social and cultural
patterns in assessing the merits of a fair use
defense.3 6 Specifically, Madison accepts as fair
any form of re-use that "falls within the bound-
aries of a recognized social or cultural pattern."
37
Patterns are social and cultural struc-
tures "that involve relatively stable sets of be-
liefs and practices grouped around individu-
als, institutions, and (often) goals."3 8 However,
not just any pattern would be sufficient: "the
decided cases suggest that the pattern should
have a pedigree of tradition and history such
that the practices embedded in the pattern are
characteristically recognized as 'creative' or at
-least tending to promote some sort of 'progress'
that does not depend on the market
economy."3 9 These kinds of patterns would be
more legitimately valued by reason of their
documented presence in society.
The Copyright Act already recognizes a
list of such patterns as fair-use, including "criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching...
scholarship, or research." 4° The phenomenon
of sampling could also be considered a legiti-
mate cultural pattern justifying application of
the fair use defense whenever it occurs.
Although Madison's approach has
promise as a legitimate basis for the fair use
defense, it does not offer clear answers to the
problem of establishing the boundaries of per-
missible, non-licensed sampling. Professor
Madison suggests that, if sampling is accepted
as a socially-recognizable pattern, then virtu-
ally any kind of sampling could be considered
fair use. This result fails to acknowledge the
copyright holder's need for adequate compen-
sation for the use of their works. Without a
"The phenomenon of sampling could
also be considered a legitimate
cultural pattern justifying application
of the fair use defense whenever it
occurs. i
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doubt, sampling artists would be pleased if this
approach were to gain a foothold because they
would no longer have to negotiate or pay for
licenses or face copyright owners in court. That
result would be fundamentally unfair to copy-
right owners, who deserve some kind of com-
pensation for their creative contributions.
E. Educational Use
Evans C. Anyanwu argues that rap mu-
sic "is mainly social commentary providing the
world with a useful and artistic depiction of life
in the Black community."41 In his view, the in-
formative and educational value of rap justifies
the protection of most sampling as fair use un-
der the Copyright Act.42 He supports his posi-
tion with a report by education professors in
The English Journal, which states that "[h]ip-
hop can be used as a bridge linking the seem-
ingly vast span between the streets and the
world of Academics." 43 Rap music and sam-
pling, he says, should be encouraged because
of their potential for "enriching a poor and
undereducated segment of [African] Ameri-
cans."
44
Like the pattern-oriented approach,
Anyanwu's proposal is flawed because it refuses
to acknowledge the interests of copyright own-
ers who desire compensation for their original,
creative works. Anyanwu doesn't even try to
balance the competing interests of copyright
owners and sampling artists, rejecting the
former interest as somehow violative of human
rights and/or progressive values. Therefore, his
approach is impractical and fundamentally
unsound.
IV. Conclusion
Each of these alternative proposals
would achieve some of the goals discussed
above in Section II, but it seems that none of
these approaches would fully achieve them all.
The pattern-oriented, educational use, and eco-
nomic approaches seem to disproportionately
benefit sampling artists while leaving copyright
owners largely uncompensated. On the other
hand, the voluntary structured negotiation ap-
proach has limited potential because it does not
radically differ from the present system. Ulti-
mately, the compulsory licensing schemes
come closest to achieving the five goals.
Although compulsory licensing
schemes do not completely eliminate all of the
uncertainties involved in sampling infringe-
ment questions, they nevertheless seem pref-
erable to the other alternatives because they
generally offer more clearly defined boundaries
for sampling artists, thereby minimizing the
need for litigation and ad-hoc determinations.
No other proposal even comes close to match-
ing the potential of compulsory licenses in mini-
mizing the difficulty of negotiating the terms
of licenses, while satisfying the economic inter-
ests of both copyright owners and sampling
artists. In the end, the solution that balances
the financial requirements of these parties, while
minimizing the extent of their interactions, is
probably the best one.
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